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Abstract Engineers are normally seen as the archetype of people who make
decisions in a rational and quantitative way. However, technological design is not
value neutral. The way a technology is designed determines its possibilities, which
can, for better or for worse, have consequences for human wellbeing. This leads
various scholars to the claim that engineers should explicitly take into account
ethical considerations. They are at the cradle of new technological developments
and can thereby inﬂuence the possible risks and beneﬁts more directly than anybody
else. I have argued elsewhere that emotions are an indispensable source of ethical
insight into ethical aspects of risk. In this paper I will argue that this means that
engineers should also include emotional reﬂection into their work. This requires a
new understanding of the competencies of engineers: they should not be unemo-
tional calculators; quite the opposite, they should work to cultivate their moral
emotions and sensitivity, in order to be engaged in morally responsible engineering.
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Introduction
The title of this paper (‘emotional engineers’) might strike the reader as an
oxymoron: Engineers are normally seen as the archetype of rational and
quantitatively oriented people. However, in this paper I will argue that engineers
should use their emotions in order to develop morally responsible technologies. This
requires a new understanding of the competencies of engineers: they should not be
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-010-9236-0unemotional calculators; quite the opposite, they should work to cultivate their
moral emotions and sensitivity, in order to be optimally engaged in morally
responsible engineering.
Values in Technology
A common view amongst engineers is that technology is value-neutral and
engineering a predominantly mathematical, quantitative discipline. However,
various scholars from different backgrounds have argued that technological design
is not value neutral. The way a technology is designed determines its possibilities,
which can, for better or for worse, have consequences for human well-being.
Scholars in the ﬁeld of society and technology studies (STS, Winner 1980) and in
continental philosophy of technology (Verbeek 2005; Ihde 1990) have shown how
the way technological products are designed determines our behavior.
In the ﬁeld of legal decision making, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) have argued that
our choices are largely determined by the design of the products and infrastructures
we use. This is similar to the phenomenon of framing in the communication of
statistical information (cf. Tversky and Kahneman 1974). For example, depending
on where healthy and unhealthy snacks are placed in a cafeteria, people will be more
prone to buy the one rather than the other. Thaler and Sunstein argue that there is no
neutral design; no matter how somebody designs a product, that will to a signiﬁcant
degree inﬂuence our behavior. Hence, it is better to intentionally design products
and infrastructures in such a way that they lead us to responsible behavior rather
than making arbitrary or unconscious design-choices that might lead to suboptimal
or even irresponsible behavior.
Recently, scholars in analytical philosophy of technology have also developed an
account for including moral values
1 in the development of technologies in order to
come to morally better designs. This account is called ‘value sensitive design’
(Van den Hoven 2007). Design teams should include moral values and stakeholder
values in an iterative process in the technologies they develop (Friedman 2004;
Zwart et al. 2006).
It is curious how scholars from such diverse backgrounds as decision theory, STS
and continental and analytical philosophy of technology independently come to very
similar conclusions, partially without even mentioning parallel developments in
different disciplines and discourses. Hopefully, this will change in the future by
more interdisciplinary research so that scholars from different disciplines can draw
on each other’s insights and developments. In any case, the fact that these different
disciplines come to similar insights from very different perspectives makes their
point even more urgent, that is, that technological design includes values that shape
our behavior. However, rather than leaving up these values to be included by
happenstance, we should intentionally include values that improve our behavior.
1 In this paper, I focus on moral values, but a same argument can be made for other values, e.g. aesthetic
values.
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take place after a product is already developed. Noe ¨mi Manders-Huits and Michael
Zimmer (Manders-Huits and Zimmer 2009) have argued that it would be useful to
have a so-called ‘values-advocate’ in a design team to make sure that values get due
attention; this could be a moral philosopher or a social scientist. However, I believe
that it might not be feasible to have somebody with such a background on each and
every design team. Engineers themselves should also be trained to be aware of
moral values and to explicitly take them into consideration in the design process
(cf. Van der Burg and Van Gorp 2005). Rather than delegating moral reﬂection to
‘moral experts’, engineers should cultivate their own moral expertise. They have a
key moral responsibility in the design process of risky technologies, as they have the
technical expertise and are at the cradle of new developments. Engineers can reduce
the risks of a technological product by developing a different design.
Risk and value sensitive design can be seen as two sides of the same coin. With
value sensitive design we try to diminish the potentially negative effects of risky
technologies. Engineers can inﬂuence the possible risks and beneﬁts more directly
than anybody else. However, technological risks and beneﬁts are not merely a
technical matter but also involve ethical aspects. This requires a capacity to be
aware of moral saliences. I have argued elsewhere that emotions are an
indispensable source of insight into ethical aspects of risk. In the remainder of
this paper, I will argue that this means that engineers should also include emotional
reﬂection into their work.
Risk, Values and Emotions
Engineers, policy-makers and other risk-experts generally deﬁne risk as a product of
probabilities and unwanted consequences. Examples of unwanted consequences are
the number of deaths or injuries, or the degree of pollution. In risk analysis and risk
management, engineers, policy makers and other risk-experts use cost-beneﬁt
analysis to weigh the possible advantages of a technology against its possible
disadvantages.
Many social scientists and philosophers who work in the ﬁeld of risk argue that
cost-beneﬁt analysis and the deﬁnition of risk as a product of probabilities and
unwanted consequences are not sufﬁcient to determine whether a risk is acceptable
or not. They also emphasize the importance of further considerations such as
whether a risk is taken voluntarily, the distribution of risks and beneﬁts in a
population, and the available alternatives to a technology. Furthermore, a high
probability of a small effect might be more acceptable than a small probability of a
large effect, even though the product of probability and effect might be
approximately equal. Defenders of such an approach argue that all risk judgments
involve evaluative aspects. Even the standard deﬁnition of risk involves an
evaluative judgment as to what counts as an unwanted consequence (Fischhoff,
Lichtenstein et al. 1981; Jasanoff 1993; Shrader-Frechette 1991; Krimsky and
Golding 1992; Slovic 2000; Jaeger, Renn et al. 2001). Hence, risk is not only a
quantitative notion; rather, it also involves ethical considerations which
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ethical considerations do play a role in the risk perceptions of laypeople (Slovic
2000). Hence, they have a richer understanding of risk than experts, which is needed
for a complete moral evaluation of risks (Slovic 2000; Roeser 2007).
Empirical research by Paul Slovic and others shows that emotions are a major
determinant in the risk perceptions of laypeople (Alhakami and Slovic 1994;
Slovic 1999; Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic 2002). Slovic says that emotion and
reason can interact and that we should take the emotions of the public seriously
since they convey meaning; still, he sees analytic methods as the ﬁnal arbiter in
estimating risks (Slovic et al. 2004). Other scholars even go so far as to say that
emotions should be excluded from decision making about risk (Sunstein 2005)o r
that they should at most be accepted as an unfortunate fact of life (Loewenstein;
Weber et al. 2001, p. 281) or used instrumentally, in order to create acceptance
for a technology (De Hollander and Hanemaaijer 2003). This interpretation of
risk-emotions threatens to undermine the earlier rehabilitation of the risk
perceptions of laypeople.
The theoretical framework that most scholars who work on risk and emotion
endorse is Dual Process Theory (e.g. Slovic 2002). According to Dual Process
Theory, there are two distinct systems with which we apprehend reality. System 1 is
unconscious, fast, intuitive and emotional while system 2 is conscious, slow,
analytical and rational (Epstein 1994; Sloman 1996; Sloman 2002; Stanovich and
West 2002). Rational beliefs are supposed to be an afterthought to our immediate
emotional responses (cf. Zajonc 1984; Haidt 2001).
The danger of this approach is that emotions can be discarded as irrational,
subjective states. However, there are emotions that by their very nature transcend
the two systems postulated by Dual Process Theory (Roeser 2009). These are
emotions that involve a high degree of reﬂectivity and narrativity, such as emotional
responses to ﬁctional characters or to people or events who or which are far away
(for a more nuanced view on the relation between reason and emotions in
philosophy, cf. e.g., de Sousa 1987; Greenspan 1988; Solomon 1993; Stocker and
Hegeman 1996; Goldie 2000; Nussbaum 2001; Roberts 2003).
Many emotions are spontaneous responses to what is nearby, but for example
sympathetic emotions can lead us to extend our ‘circle of concern’, as Nussbaum
(2001) phrases it. If we think about the suffering that other people might undergo by
being the victims of a disaster, we usually feel touched and shocked about this. This
realization involves moral emotions. These are emotions that are reﬂective,
justiﬁable and based on reasons. Hence, such moral emotions neither ﬁt neatly into
system 1 nor into system 2. We need moral emotions in order to be aware of moral
aspects of risky technologies (Roeser 2006b). For example, by caring about certain
things we are able to perceive evaluative aspects of the world that we would
otherwise not be able to be aware of (Little 1995; Blum 1994). Purely rational
reﬂection would not be able to provide us with the imaginary power that we need to
envisage future scenarios and to take part in other people’s perspectives and to
evaluate their destinies.
Hence, the fact that the risk perceptions of laypeople involve emotions does not
make them suspicious, to the contrary. We need moral emotions in order to have
106 S. Roeser
123well-grounded insights into whether a technological risk is morally acceptable or
not. For example, enthusiasm for a technology can point to beneﬁts to our well-
being, whereas fear and worry can indicate that a technology is a threat to our well-
being; sympathy and empathy can give us insights in fair distributions of risks and
beneﬁts, and indignation can indicate violations of autonomy by technological risks
that are imposed on us against our will (Roeser 2006b). Of course these emotions
are not infallible: they can bias us towards what is close by. However, all our
cognitive capacities are fallible, but we cannot do without them. We need emotions
for well-grounded moral evaluations of risk. Emotions can themselves be a source
of critical reﬂection about our risk-emotions (Roeser 2010). Such an approach can
provide for a richer account of the importance of emotions in ethical reﬂection about
risk than Dual Process Theory (Roeser 2009). Rather than being biases that threaten
objectivity and rationality in thinking about acceptable risks, emotions contribute to
a correct understanding of the moral acceptability of a hazard.
Risk-Emotions of Engineers
Engineers are often considered as the archetype of people who perform their work in
a rational and quantitative way. They exemplify the idea, which is also endorsed by
many Dual Process Theorists, that computational intelligence is superior to other
human capacities of processing information, such as intuition and emotion.
However, there are scholars who challenge this computational ideal of
intelligence (Dreyfus 1992). Some authors emphasize the importance of narrative
intelligence (Mateas and Sengers 2003). Other authors emphasize emotional
intelligence (Goleman 1995). These are forms of intelligence that go beyond
deductive reasoning and analytical, logical thinking and that play an essential role in
our practical rationality. People who lack on these capacities have difﬁculties
making practical and moral judgments (Damasio 1994).
Several authors emphasize that emotions are needed for moral conduct by
business managers (Simon 1987; Mumby and Putnam 1992; Gaudine and Thorne
2001; Klein 2002; Lurie 2004). We can extend this idea to other professionals, and
more speciﬁcally, for the purpose of this paper, to engineers. We need engineers
who have a sufﬁciently developed emotional sensitivity as this will give them access
to morally important aspects of the technologies they design.
2
It might be objected that we should leave the moral decision making about risky
technologies to policy makers. However, as I have argued earlier, that would be a
missed opportunity. It might mean that we try to constrain a technology when it is
already too late. A more fruitful way is to let engineers explicitly and intentionally
2 The ‘rationalistic’ bias in current engineering culture is also reﬂected by the fact that engineering is
considered to be a ‘male’ profession, with a low percentage of female engineers and engineering students,
as the concepts ‘rational’, ‘male’ and ‘emotional’, ‘female’ are traditionally linked (cf. Faulkner 2000,
Robinson and Mcllwee 2005).Turning engineering into a ‘softer’ discipline might also have an effect on
gender roles, possibly making engineering a more attractive discipline for women.
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claim that emotions are a necessary source of moral reﬂection about risky
technologies, this means that the emotions of engineers should play a role in the
design of risky technologies.
3
All this means that when educating and recruiting engineers, the emphasis
shouldn’t solely be on ‘analytical’ or ‘hard’ skills, as has traditionally been the case,
but also on ‘emotional’ or ‘soft’ skills. Currently, many technical universities
include compulsory ethics-courses in their curricula (cf. Zandvoort et al. (2000),
also cf. the ABET-criteria that require ethics courses in engineering curricula in the
United States). This is an important step in the right direction. However, the
emphasis in such courses is still mainly on argumentative and reasoning-skills. In
addition, engineering-education should also include the development of sympathetic
and emotional skills. This could be done by role playing games, through which the
imaginative and emotional capacities of engineering students can be trained in a
safe setting. An additional trajectory would be to include literature-courses and
other parts of a liberal arts-education in the curriculum of engineering education
programs (cf. Nussbaum (1997) who argues for this in a broad way, not speciﬁcally
concerning engineering education).
4
So far I have sketched why we need to emphasize the emotional capacities of
engineers, and how this could be achieved. In the next section I will discuss how we
can implement emotional reﬂection in the engineering design process.
Including Emotions in the Design Process
As I argued in the previous sections, we need engineers who take their emotional
responses seriously, as emotions are helpful in assessing the moral values involved
in technologies. This will enable engineers to play an important role in reﬂecting on
morally responsible technological design. The importance of the emotions of
engineers has so far not been mentioned by the scholars who emphasize values in
design and whom I have discussed in section 2. Similar to scholars who work on
risk, many scholars who work on values in design see reason as the predestined
faculty of critical, moral deliberation, and they see emotions as a threat to rational
decision making. At most they acknowledge that engineers should take into account
the wants and desires of the customers. However, wants and desires are not
necessarily emotions, and they are not necessarily grounded in moral consider-
ations. My alternative account of emotions in risk perception also applies to the
design of risky technologies. Emotions should play a key role in risk perception and
in value sensitive design. Emotions sensitize us for complex ethical considerations
that are involved in the awareness of the risks of technologies as much as in
deliberating about how to diminish these risks in designing technologies. Emotions
and scientiﬁc methods should be in a good balance when engineers think about
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee to press me on this point.
4 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that this is already the case in engineering
curricula in the United States. However, in for example the Netherlands and Germany, this is not yet the
case.
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about moral saliences. Both kinds of information are inevitable if engineers want to
make well-grounded judgments about acceptable risks.
Experts often accuse the public of being overly frightened of new technologies
because they lack the relevant knowledge and are thereby basing their reactions on
supposedly irrational feelings. Interestingly, nanotechnology gives rise to greater
worries amongst experts than amongst the public (Scheufele, Corley et al. 2007). Of
course, this is partially due to fact that most laypeople have never heard of
nanotechnology. However, given the newness of nanotechnology, we can assume
that the experts are more knowledgeable than the public about nanotechnology and
its concomitant risks. Apparently, their fears can be attributed to a rational
understanding of the risks involved in nanotechnology. Indeed, fear can point to a
source of danger to our well-being (Green 1992; Roberts 2003; Roeser, 2009).
Engineers should use these worries in the design of their research and
technologies, e.g., by building barriers to prevent certain hazards from occurring
or by applying a precautionary approach, meaning that technologies of which the
consequences are hard to predict should ﬁrst be investigated in a safe setting. If
experts are worried about the safety of the products they develop, this should be
taken seriously and as a warning sign, asking for a precautionary approach. Experts
should communicate their emotional-ethical concerns about technological risks and
beneﬁts to the public in addition to supplying quantitative information.
Fear about unpredictable consequences concerns situations in which even the
experts do not know exactly what the implications of a technology might be.
However, even if the consequences of a technology are fairly well known, there can
be remaining emotional-ethical concerns that should be taken seriously. For
example, emotions such as sympathy help to reveal ethical considerations such as
justice and autonomy in decisions about acceptable risk (Roeser 2006b). By merely
focusing on for example annual fatalities, as is the case in conventional approaches
to risk analysis, we might overlook other morally relevant considerations which can
be revealed through emotions. Emotions about risks can be based on reasonable
concerns, for example regarding justice, fairness and autonomy. These concerns
should be taken seriously by engineers when they reﬂect about the risky aspects of
the technologies they design.
In the design process there should be a discussion-phase in which the emotional
and ethical concerns of the engineers and of stakeholders are made explicit, thereby
facilitating ethical reﬂection about possible risks and how to avoid or diminish these
risks. Several methods have been developed to enable reﬂection about technology,
for example scenarios that describe situations in which the use of a technology gives
rise to moral considerations (cf. e.g. Boenink et al. 2010). These methods involve
narratives that directly engage the imaginative and empathetic capacities of people.
To the extent that this is not already the case, these methods could be further
developed to explicitly encourage emotional engagement and emotional reﬂection.
An objection might be that the emotions of different people are too divergent to
play such an important role. To this I would like to reply that of course the
emotional responses of people can differ, but disagreement is nearly always a part
of collective decision making, whether or not emotions are included. We should
Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design 109
123accept the possibly diverging emotions of people and discuss the concerns that lie
behind them. Considering diverging emotions and views enables more balanced
judgments. Our emotions are not infallible. Just like other sources of knowledge,
emotions can also be mistaken. We should critically assess our emotions, but in
doing so, we should take into account other emotions, those of ourselves and of
other people. Emotions can be a source of ethical reﬂection (Lacewing 2005). For
example, an emotion such as sympathy can correct egoistic emotions (Roeser
2010).
Emotion and Responsibility in Design
Let me end my discussion by elaborating on the role emotions can play in thinking
about the moral responsibility of engineers. Several authors emphasize the
importance of emotions such as shame, guilt, resentment and blame for the
understanding or ascription of responsibility (cf. Wallace 1994; Schoeman 1987;
Eisenberg 2000). These emotions work retrospectively and negatively, by
condemning failed responsibility (McGraw 1987). They can be connected with
backward-looking responsibility. On the other hand, sympathy, empathy and
compassion can let us be aware of our responsibility in a forward-looking sense (for
the distinction between these two kinds of responsibility, cf. Nihle ´n Fahlquist
(2008). They make us aware of actions we can perform in order to help to improve
the situations of others. This is conﬁrmed by empirical research by Paul Slovic.
Slovic shows that we get ‘numbed by numbers’ and statistics concerning desasters.
Emotions let us see what matters, they help to motivate. In concrete situations where
emotions are aroused, people are capable of being directly involved, and
indifference becomes less likely (Slovic 2010).
Backward-looking responsibility and its concomitant emotions are important, as
they let people critically reﬂect on what they have done in the past and how they
could have done things better. Ultimately, this should lead to enhanced emotional
sensitivity concerning forward-looking responsibility. Forward-looking responsi-
bility and the emotions that are involved with it are especially important in the
context of the moral responsibility of engineers in the design of technology, as
design is concerned with things that are yet to come.
There is a temptation to try to codify the responsibility of professionals in clear
rules that provide for infallible guidelines. However, as various moral philosophers
have argued, practical reality is so complex, and every situation so unique, that
moral insights cannot be codiﬁed and subsumed under simple rules. Rather than
applying clear-cut rules, we need context-sensitive insights. (Prichard 1912; Ewing
1929; Broad 1951 [1930]; Ross 1967 [1930]; Dancy 2004). Context-sensitive
insights require moral emotions (Damasio 1994; Roeser 2006a). It can be argued
that in the case of the design of risky technologies, context-sensitivity is even more
important, as risky technologies can lead to new and unpredictable situations that
escape codiﬁable rules.
This connects well with recent developments in thinking about responsibility as a
virtue (cf. Williams 2008). Virtue ethicists emphasize that virtuous moral agents
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context-sensitive moral judgments in complex, real-life situations. A virtuous
person is somebody whose character is developed in such a way that she steers a
wise middle ground between extreme responses. According to some virtue ethicists,
this requires that the virtuous person has well developed emotions (Roberts 2003;
Do ¨ring and Feger 2010; Roberts 2010). A virtue-responsible person is aware of the
different normative claims that rest on her and makes the right decision. She is
responsive to her responsibilities and ready to act accordingly.
Jessica Nihle ´n Fahlquist (Nihle ´n Fahlquist 2010) has argued that this can mean
that a professional sees that she has to transcend the formal responsibility she has
been assigned by her job description or her ofﬁcial role in the organization she
works for. According to Nihle ´n Fahlquist, such an approach can avoid the so-called
‘problem of many hands’. This problem means that in complex projects that involve
the contribution of many different professionals, things can go wrong and serious
accidents can happen although nobody acted in a clearly reckless way. Rather, some
people made small mistakes that would by themselves have been insigniﬁcant.
However, due to an unfortunate coincidence, this results in a major accident,
because several barriers have failed, as every individual relied on the expectation
that the others would do a good job. A famous example is the accident with the
Herald of Free Enterprise, where numerous insigniﬁcant mistakes led to the
capsizing of a ferry and the death of hundreds of people. The same pattern can be
seen in other major accidents as well. Nihle ´n Fahlquist argues that if professionals
just follow a minimal responsibility, this might easily lead to gaps in responsibility
distributions. This is because real life situations are much more complex than can
possibly be foreseen. However, if people see their responsibility less formally, but
rather act from virtue, they will extend their responsibility beyond their formally
assigned role. Nihle ´n Fahlquist connects this with insights from the ethics of care.
The ethics of care stresses the importance of caring for the needs that concrete
persons have, rather than merely obeying abstract rules. People who act from an
attitude of responsibility as the virtue of care will check whether things work as they
are supposed to work, even if this goes beyond their own task. They will take extra
actions if they realize that nobody feels responsibility for a situation that has not
been foreseen and has not been formalized in a distribution of tasks. This will likely
result in an environment where accidents cannot happen as easily, because more
people double-check whether things are going well rather than just doing what they
have been told to do. It will also entice people to come with creative solutions to
new situations.
This connects well with what I have said before about moral emotions of
engineers. Moral emotions make engineers sensitive to moral issues arising from the
technologies they develop. Emotions let us get involved with situations. They help
us transcend a detached, abstract attitude that could lead to indifference to morally
problematic aspects of technologies. This is especially true in the design of risky
technologies, where there might be consequences of which we do not know whether
and when they manifest themselves, or that are unforeseen or difﬁcult to quantify. A
formalistic approach to responsibility can easily lead to negligence or the idea that
‘others are responsible’.
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Gorp 2005). The design team of a new trailer was aware that the trailer could be
designed in a safer way, but since the client had not asked for that, they did not
explore that alternative. However, the client, not being a technical expert, was not
even aware of the fact that there was a safer alternative. Hence, here the engineers
should have taken a pro-active attitude, bringing this option up with the client. Van
der Burg and Van Gorp use a virtue ethical approach to argue that engineers should
use their imaginative capacities, for example by empathizing with possible victims
of a suboptimally safe trailer, in order to come to such a more active appreciation of
their moral responsibility in designing risky technologies.
All this shows how engineers can take on stronger responsibilities if they cherish
their imaginative, emotional capacities that are also emphasized by various virtue
ethicists. By explicitly not only allowing, but even requiring emotional consider-
ations in the engineering arena, engineers will feel involved, responsible and prone
to take action. This will lead to morally better designs and to more humane
technologies.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that in order to have engineers who are morally sensitive
to ethical aspects of their work, we need engineers who have well-developed
emotional capacities. Engineers who are trained in using their empathy and
sympathy can imagine themselves in different roles, for example in the role of
victims of risky technologies. This enables them to realize that they should go
beyond their formally deﬁned role, and to be motivated accordingly. This means
that.
1. we need to include emotional-ethical reﬂection and deliberation in the design
process of risky technologies; and
2. we have to revise our curricula for engineering education, by including courses
that enhance the emotional and imaginative capacities of future engineers.
This will enable engineers to live up to the moral responsibilities that are inherent
to their work.
5
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